Abstract-This paper exploits the potential of large antenna arrays at millimeter-wave (mm-Wave) frequencies to develop a low-complexity directional modulation technique, Antenna Subset Modulation (ASM), for point-to-point secure wireless communication. The main idea in ASM is to modulate the radiation pattern at the symbol rate by driving only a subset of antennas in the array. This results in a directional radiation pattern that projects a sharply defined constellation in the desired direction and randomizes the constellation in other directions. To implement ASM, a simple antenna selection technique that selects an antenna subset randomly for every symbol is proposed. While randomly switching antenna subsets does not affect the symbol modulation for a desired receiver along the main direction, it effectively randomizes the amplitude and phase of the received symbol for an eavesdropper along a sidelobe. Statistical analysis and numerical examples are presented to highlight the superior performance and secrecy capacity achieved by ASM.
I. INTRODUCTION
The millimeter-wave (mm-Wave) band between 30 and 300 GHz offers an abundance of bandwidth for applications such as wireless backhaul, personal area networking, local area networking, and cellular communication [1] - [5] . Because of the large bandwidth and ensuing high noise levels, most mm-Wave systems use array-based directional beamforming techniques to enhance the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). At mm-Wave frequencies, these arrays can contain in excess of 64 antennas and may be co-located with active circuit components on a single silicon die due to the small wavelengths.
Security is an important requirement for commercial wireless systems, and mm-Wave communication is no exception. While 60-GHz links experience high atmospheric absorption [6] , other mm-Wave bands may be more vulnerable to interception. It may be possible, for a sufficiently sensitive eavesdropper, to recover information from the signal that escapes through sidelobes. Consequently, it is of interest to develop beamforming techniques that provide an extra layer of security by exploiting flexibility at the physical (PHY) layer.
Directional modulation (DM) is one approach for achieving enhanced security. Several related approaches have been proposed that leverage multiple transmit antennas including nearfield antenna-level modulation, switched antenna phased array transmitters and spatial keying (SK) transmission techniques such as spatial modulation (SM) and space shift keying (SSK). Previous work in [7] introduced an analog transmit architecture for synthesizing directional information based on near-field direct antenna modulation. Other prior work on DM techniques [8] - [12] has primarily dealt with sub-GHz communication via small antenna arrays. By modifying the weights at each antenna of a phased array, a symbol with desired phase and amplitude can be created along a particular direction while purposely distorting the constellation in other directions. Apart from DM techniques designed to achieve communication secrecy, there have also been studies on the effect of multiple antennas and fading on the secrecy capacity [13] , [14] .
In this paper, we propose a low-complexity DM technique called Antenna Subset Modulation (ASM). We introduce ASM as an antenna-level modulation technique that eliminates conventional baseband circuitry and takes advantage of the full antenna array with a limited number of radio frequency (RF) chains. By providing a simple inter-antenna phase shift and driving a different subset of antennas at each symbol interval, we show that it is possible to create a directiondependent modulated signal. This allows the transmitter to introduce additional randomness in the constellations viewed at angles other than the target one. We propose a simple antenna subset selection technique to implement ASM in uniform linear arrays. We capture the subset selection procedure using a simplified statistical model and show that the received symbol distribution in undesired directions can be closely approximated by a Gaussian distribution. Equipped with the statistics of the received symbol distribution, we then proceed to evaluate the average uncoded symbol error rate (SER) and secrecy capacity achieved by ASM with Kary PSK modulation. In a longer version of this paper [15] , we propose an optimized antenna subset selection technique based on simulated annealing algorithm that offers even better security and array performance.
II. PRINCIPLES OF ANTENNA SUBSET MODULATION
Consider a multiple-input single-output (MISO) communication system with N transmit and a single receive antenna. We posit an N -element linear array of isotropic antennas centered at the origin with uniform spacing d along the x-axis. Assuming a narrowband channel with perfect synchronization and symbol-rate sampling, the received signal along any direction θ at discrete-time k can be written as
where h is the N × 1 channel vector, x is the transmit signal vector and v ∼ CN (0, N 0 /2). Invoking a narrowband channel model is justified at mm-Wave because the line-of-sight (LoS) component usually dominates due to relatively high reflection and scattering losses from indoor building materials [16] . We specify d ≤ λ/2, where λ is the wavelength, to avoid creating grating lobes. The channel for a receiver located along the θ direction can then be written as [17] h * (θ) = e −j(
where the phase-shifts introduced by path-length differences are referred to the center of the array.
A. Conventional Array Transmission
Consider a typical phased array transmitter where the number transmit antennas equals the number of RF chains, i.e., N = M . The array is transmitting a complex phasemodulated symbol, x(k) = √ E s e jψ(k) , to a target receiver using conventional baseband modulation. The target receiver is along the θ T radial while another receiver located along the direction θ U is eavesdropping. The transmitter knows θ T but not θ U . Using directional beamforming, the transmitter can orient its main beam along θ T by setting
The transmitted vector symbol is
Utilizing (1), the noiseless symbol received along an arbitrary direction θ is
where γ θ = γ(θ) = 2πd λ cos θ with ρ denoting a (real) scaling factor for every θ. Note that ρ(θ) < ρ(θ T ) = 1 ∀ θ = θ T . Both the target and the undesired receiver observe effectively the same information. Therefore, an eavesdropper with a sufficiently sensitive receiver can recover information from the received signal if it has enough gain to overcome the loss embodied by ρ(θ).
B. Antenna Subset Modulation
Although at mm-Wave frequencies a large number of antennas can be accommodated, the number of RF chains is still limited by cost. In an ASM transmitter, there are M RF chains but the number of antennas is now N > M . A sinusoidal carrier signal drives only a subset of the antennas after passing through phase shifters and power amplifiers (PAs) as illustrated in Fig. 1 . A fundamental difference between ASM and conventional array transmission is that, in ASM, modulation occurs in the RF domain. At each symbol, the control block synthesizes an array by selecting a subset of M antennas. Since the chosen subset used for transmission is changed from one symbol to the next, the far-field radiation pattern appears to be modulated at the symbol rate and this enhances the security of ASM. Since there is no complex baseband modulation involved, x(k) = √ E s ∀k representing the constant amplitude (unmodulated) carrier. The effects of data modulation, beam-steering and antenna subset selection at symbol k are succinctly represented by the beamforming vector
where ψ is a constant data-dependent phase offset introduced in addition to the progressive inter-antenna phase shifts, b is an N × 1 vector with b i = {0, 1} and N i=0 b i = M enforcing the constraint on the total number of active antennas. The binary vector b(k) thus encodes the M -antenna subset selected for transmitting the kth symbol. The ASM transmit signal is
If B denotes the set of all such binary vectors b, the noiseless received symbol can be expressed from (1) as
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for some b(k) ∈ B. The scaling factor ρ in (14) is in general complex for θ = θ T and changes with the symbol index k. In addition to providing directional information to the target receiver, ASM conveys misinformation in undesired directions. Let the active antenna subset, b, be chosen at random from the set B for each symbol. Because of beamforming along the target direction, the various (phase shifted) signal replicas add coherently along the mainlobe direction, i.e.,
But, outside of a narrow solid cone centered on the target radial, the signals add up misaligned in phase. Depending on the antenna subset chosen, the desired modulation symbol appears scaled and rotated to an undesired receiver. This creates a distorted constellation C U that is very different from the target constellation C T as shown in Fig. 1 . Thus, while switching the active antenna subset does not alter the constellation along the mainlobe, the symbols are distorted in both phase and amplitude for undesired receivers on the sidelobes.
III. ASM CONSTELLATION SYNTHESIS ASM can produce the desired phase of each symbol for any constant-envelope modulation scheme. The use of constant envelope signals minimizes the linearity requirement on the PAs, enabling high power efficiency.
Suppose that the symbol to be synthesized at time k has magnitude and phase given by √ E s and ψ(k), respectively. Equivalently, we require the far-field radiation pattern, denoted henceforth by F (θ), to equal √ E s e jψ(k) along θ T . Note that the dependence of the far-field pattern on symbol index k is implicit.
As remarked earlier, only a subset of M (< N ) antennas is selected for use during each symbol in ASM. The process of selectively turning off certain antennas in an array is called array thinning and the array thus synthesized is referred to as a thinned array. Let I(k) denote the set of M antennas used for transmitting the kth symbol, i.e.,
The set I(k) encodes the location of the active antennas for time index k. Thus, for a given antenna spacing d, I(k) fully characterizes the resulting spatially nonuniform array. In ASM, the modulation and beam-steering operations are performed jointly. The inter-antenna phase shift applied to steer the mainlobe towards θ T can be obtained using (2), (10) and (15) as
Thus, the composite inter-antenna phase shift, denoted by ϕ n , needed to produce the desired complex symbol along θ T is
Using (16) as beam-steering vector, the far-field radiation pattern (in the absence of mutual coupling) of the synthesized linear array along an arbitrary direction θ is
λ (cos θ−cos θT) (19) and the pattern of the array along the desired orientation θ T is
It is critical to recognize that the signals from each antenna add up with perfect alignment along the mainlobe direction to produce the desired symbol irrespective of the antenna subset picked, i.e., any randomness in the choice of the antenna subset I(k) disappears along θ = θ T .
IV. ASM FOR SECURE COMMUNICATION
Random Antenna Subset Selection (RASS) is a simple antenna subset selection technique for ASM. In RASS, the antenna subset chosen for a particular symbol is equally likely to be any of the subsets containing M active antennas. While the signals from each antenna add coherently along the mainlobe irrespective of the selected antenna subset, they add up misaligned in phase causing signal defocusing along any sidelobe direction.
A. Statistical Model and Analysis
The modulation symbols are represented by
Let θ T and Ω denote, respectively, the target radial and the angular region outside of a solid cone centered on that target radial, i.e., Ω {(θ, φ) : θ / ∈ (θ T − ζ, θ T + ζ)} for some small value ζ > 0 (usually ζ ≈ distance to the first null). Since the antennas are chosen independently at random for every symbol, we can invoke an independent Bernoulli random variable with parameter p denoting the probability of antenna selection. Choosing p = M/N , the thinning ratio, ensures that the arrays synthesized have M active antennas asymptotically. The pattern F (θ) is then modeled as a sum of N independent complex random variables (for each k) whose first-and second-order statistics can be derived analytically. We will use these statistics to approximate the uncoded SER (hereafter referred to as simply SER) produced by RASS. Note that this statistical model closely approximates the pattern of the actual array synthesized by RASS only for θ ∈ Ω.
Let X n (k) be a complex random variable denoting the weighting coefficient at the nth antenna when transmitting the kth symbol. We can express X n (k) as
where Y n (k) and Z n model the randomness in transmit symbol selection and antenna subset selection, respectively. According to the proposed statistical model,
Analogous to (17) , an approximate stochastic model for the pattern of a thinned array synthesized using RASS is
where ∼ differentiates the stochastic model from the true pattern F (θ). For any given k, (23) is a weighted sum of N independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) complex random variables and it is thereby closely approximated by a complex Gaussian distribution for large enough N , i.e., F (θ) ∼ CN (μ(θ),P (θ)). The I and Q parts ofF (θ) can be stacked to form a two-dimensional real Gaussian vector
whereμ(θ) ∈ R 2×1 andP(θ) ∈ R 2×2 denote the mean and covariance of the 2-D real Gaussian distribution.
To analyze the average SER under RASS, we compute the mean and covariance of the 2-D Gaussian distribution (that characterizes the received symbol distribution in undesired directions) as (30) and (31) respectively. For a detailed statistical analysis and derivation of the mean and covariance parameters, the reader is referred to [15] .
It is important to note that both the mean and variance of the real and imaginary components ofF (θ) are a function of the transmitted symbol for any observation angle and decay to zero in an oscillatory manner as we move away from the target radial. However, the total varianceP (θ) =
is constant (in terms of the observation angle θ) for a given array configuration. Several remarks can be made from diagonal entries of (31). First, when M = N the thinned array degenerates to a uniform array and there is no randomness in the received symbol in any direction. This is confirmed by the individual variances of the I and Q components going to zero irrespective of θ. Second, for a fixed M , adding more antennas to the array (thereby reducing the thinning ratio M/N ) increases the total variance. An increase in the variance of the received symbol in undesired directions is helpful because it provides more security. Also, the off-diagonal entries in (31) show that the artificial randomness introduced in the I and Q components of the received symbol along undesired transmit directions may be correlated. However, the magnitude of the correlation is small (< 0.1) for most angles.
Zero-mean Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) is easily incorporated by modifying the covarianceP(θ): if N 0 denotes the total noise variance, the mean and covariance of the received symbol in undesired directions becomẽ
B. Secure Communication Link
Equipped with the statistics of the Gaussian approximation to the received symbol, we now analyze the corresponding SER in AWGN. For K-ary PSK, the modulation symbols are represented by s for = 0, 1, . . . , K − 1 as in (21). From (30), and (31) we see that, unlike in AWGN, the parameters of the received distribution depend on the transmit symbol s . To make this dependence explicit, we denote the mean and covariance of the received symbol byμ N ( , θ) andP N ( , θ), respectively. The average SER according to our statistical model for the received symbol distribution can be expressed as (34), where Λ is the Voronoi region associated with s and P N ( , θ) > 0.
One can also quantify the degree of transmission security in an information-theoretic sense, using the notion of secrecy capacity. The secrecy capacity of a channel is the maximum transmission rate at which information can be communicated reliably and securely. In [18] , it was shown that for a Gaussian wiretap channel the secrecy capacity, denoted by C S , is the difference between the capacity of the main and the wiretap channels. Adopting this definition, and denoting the target and undesired receiver's capacity by C T and C U , respectively,
For QPSK transmission,
where C QPSK (·) denotes the spectral efficiency of QPSK in AWGN.
We need to find the average SNR for the two transmission schemes to calculate their secrecy capacities. For conventional array transmission, invoking (5), the SNR assuming rectangular pulse shaping is
For ASM, the SNR at the target receiver's location equals that of conventional array transmission since the constellation is undistorted in this direction. To calculate the SNR along undesired directions, we invoke the Gaussian approximation to the received symbol distribution. The average SNR for ASM is then
where θ ∈ Ω. A numerical example comparing the secrecy capacities of ASM and conventional array transmission is presented in Section V.
V. EXAMPLES
In this section, we present numerical examples illustrating the transmission security of ASM. equal to the active set size of the ASM array. Along with the average SER curves from simulation, the theoretical SER for RASS (cf. (34)) is plotted in Fig. 2 ; both are in close agreement for angles θ ∈ Ω. ASM achieves a higher SER compared to conventional array transmission in unwanted directions. Moreover, ASM produces a narrower information beamwidth around the target angle. It is important to note that ASM provides these security benefits without additional transmit power, unlike other DM techniques [8] , [9] that tradeoff security for some increase in transmission power. Next, in Fig 3, we present results on the SER of ASM for an eavesdropper, again in comparison with conventional array transmission. With the target receiver located along θ T = 45
• , two angular locations are considered for the eavesdropper: scenario (a) θ a = θ T + 5
• = 50
• , and scenario (b) θ b = θ T + 122
• = 167
• . In both situations, ASM outperforms conventional array transmission. Even as the SNR increases, ASM maintains a high SER while, for a conventional array, the SER falls off rapidly with the SNR.
Finally, Fig. 4 shows the improved secrecy capacity of ASM. Eqs. (36), (37) and (39) were applied with QPSK. ASM achieves better secrecy capacity compared to conventional array transmission, where in multiple transmit angles the secrecy capacity is rather low. Another desirable characteristic of ASM, evident from the figure, is its ability to create a link with secrecy capacity close to the actual capacity without eavesdropping (in this case, 2 bits/s/Hz) over a wide range of angles. Moreover, the secrecy capacity of ASM is nonzero even as SNR → ∞ because of its inherent irreducible artificial noise.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, Antenna Subset Modulation (ASM) was proposed to take advantage of massive antenna arrays at mm-Wave frequencies. In ASM, the radiation pattern of the array is modulated at the symbol rate to achieve directiondependent data transmission. Unlike other directional modulation techniques, which scramble the desired constellation in unwanted directions, ASM provides security by introducing additional points in the constellation that appear effectively random to an undesired receiver. A simple constellation design procedure was described and a randomized antenna subset selection technique for implementing ASM was proposed. Examples validated the security benefits of ASM. Extending the analysis to multidimensional periodic arrays and incorporating multidirectional transmission capabilities to ASM are interesting research problems that merit further study.
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